Abstract To what extent citizens are willing not only to support ambitious climate policy but also willing to pay for such policy remains subject to debate. Our analysis addresses three issues in this regard: whether, as is widely assumed but not empirically established, willingness to support (WTS) is higher than willingness to pay (WTP); whether the determinants of the two are similar; and what accounts for within-subject similarity between WTS and WTP. We address these issues based on data from an original nationally representative survey (N = 2500) on forest conservation in Brazil, arguably the key climate policy issue in the country. The findings reveal that WTP is much lower than WTS. The determinants differ to some extent as well, regarding the effects of age, gender, and trust in government. The analysis also provides insights into factors influencing how much WTS and WTP line up within individuals, with respect to age, education, political ideology, salience of the deforestation issue, and trust in government. Our findings provide a more nuanced picture of how strong public support for climate change policy is and a starting point for more targeted climate policy communication.
spending (Kane and Shogren 2000; Grothmann and Patt 2005) . Though cost estimates concerning climate policy are plagued by high degrees of uncertainty, such policy is bound to impose substantial opportunity costs on individuals and societies as a whole (Victor et al. 2005; Stern et al. 2006; McCollum et al. 2013; Nordhaus 2015) . Particularly in democratic countries, policy-makers are thus-and, from a normative democratic standpoint, should beaffected in their climate policy decisions by what citizens want (Drews and Van den Bergh 2016) .
Public opinion surveys have sought to measure the Bpublic will^in this respect and to identify determinants of variation in country-level and individual attitudes and preferences (e.g., Scruggs and Benegal 2012; Harring and Jagers 2013; Geels, 2013; Wiseman et al. 2013; Kachi et al. 2015) . Many of these studies have gauged, based on surveys and survey experiments, people's concern about climate change and their support or opposition to climate change mitigation, in a general sense, or with respect to specific mitigation measures (e.g., Ryan and Spash 2011; Vincent et al. 2014 ). According to a recent survey by PEW (2015) , for instance, 54% in all 40 countries polled (average across the 40 countries) consider climate change a very serious problem. Seventy-eight percent on average want their country to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Survey embedded experiments show, however, that when people are confronted with cost implications of mitigation policy, they become less supportive (e.g., Gampfer et al. 2014; Bechtel and Scheve 2013) . This suggests that differences in survey design and item wording matter and that we should pay greater attention to differences between willingness to support (WTS) climate mitigation policy and willingness to pay (WTP) for such policy. The existing literature focuses to a large degree on WTS measures, and there are fewer studies that examine WTP for climate mitigation (e.g., Carlsson and Martinsson 2001; Turpie 2003; Brouwer et al. 2008; Solomon and Johnson 2009; Diederich and Goeschl 2014) .
The existing evidence suggests that WTS survey instruments are likely to produce higher scores than WTP instruments (e.g., Seip and Strand 1992) . However, to the best of our knowledge, this has not yet been systematically examined, though some studies on climate policy use WTP measurements and a few studies use both WTS and WTP approaches. In depth analysis of differences between WTS and WTP can provide several insights. First, it can offer a more nuanced picture of constraints public opinion may impose on climate policy-making, relative to focusing on WTS alone. It may, for instance, help in highlighting differences in public support levels associated with more or less manifest cost implications. Second, it allows us to examine whether determinants of WTS and WTP are similar. Third, it can generate information on what types of citizens are more likely to be what we will call Bnon-green^(both low WTS and WTP), Bdeep green^(both high WTS and WTP), Bshallow green^(high WTS but low WTP), or Bparadox green^(low WTS but high WTP, paradox because the presumption is that WTS is generally higher than WTP).
We address these questions based on data from an original nationally representative survey in Brazil (N = 2500) that was implemented between late 2015 and early 2016. This survey focused on climate change mitigation and forest conservation, which is the most important and publicly salient climate policy issue in Brazil. Our survey included a range of WTS and WTP items as well as items on potential determinants of variation in individual level WTS and WTP.
Conceptual differences between WTS and WTP
Most research on climate policy preferences focuses on people's general support for (or opposition to) climate policy. For example, a 2010 World Bank survey asks: BAs you may know, [participant's country] and other countries from around the world will be meeting in December in Copenhagen to develop a new agreement to take steps against climate change by limiting greenhouse gas emissions. If the other countries come to an agreement, do you think [participant's country] should or should not be willing to commit to limiting its greenhouse gas emissions as part of such an agreement?^Factors that are used to explain preferences, captured in such form, include for instance socio-demographic variables, risk perceptions, general world-views, trust in public institutions, political ideology, and self-efficacy (e.g., Tobler et al. 2012; Geels 2013; Wiseman et al. 2013; Drews and Van den Bergh 2016) .
Other research has examined WTP (e.g., Inglehart 1995; Jacobsen and Hanley 2009; Lindhjem and Tuan 2012; Krosnick and MacInnis 2013; Diederich and Goeschl 2014) . In general, we see two basic approaches of measuring WTP: revealed preferences and stated preferences. The first approach examines individuals' behavior in order to capture their (revealed) preferences towards climate change mitigation (e.g., Jaccard et al. 2003; Bürer and Wüstenhagen 2009; Diederich and Goeschl 2014) . The second approach asks participants to choose from hypothetical choice sets. The stated preferences approach is categorized further according to the type of valuation question, e.g., dichotomous choice using bid amounts (e.g., Cameron 2005; Brouwer et al. 2008) , payment cards (e.g., Solomon and Johnson 2009 ), or open-ended questions (e.g., Kotchen et al. 2013 ). For instance, Aldy et al. (2012) employ different randomized amounts to ask survey participants how much they think a national clean energy standard (NCES) would increase their annual household electricity bill. To this end, they offer Bbid^amounts between $5 and $155. They find that a $10 increase in the annual household cost of the NCES decreases the probability of policy support by 1 percentage point. Likewise, Kotchen et al. (2013) conclude that BUS households are, on average, willing to pay between $79 and $89 per year in support of reducing domestic greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions 17% by 2020. Even very conservative estimates yield an average WTP at or above $60 per year.^Other studies expose survey participants to climate policy proposals and let them express their preferences vis-à-vis such proposals. Such choice experiments can provide information on what role cost implications play, relative to other policy attributes. They find that support for climate policies tends to decline with increasing costs. Similarly, framing experiments that randomly embed references to costs in survey items gauging climate policy references show that support for climate policy declines to some extent when costs are referred to (Gampfer et al. 2014; Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Bernauer and McGrath 2016) .
Whereas most of the existing research employs either a WTS or a WTP approach, we are interested in comparing the two. There is considerable disagreement in the environmentaleconomics literature on the extent to whether the two concepts can be used interchangeably. Randall and Stoll (1980) , for instance, argue that WTP and WTS do not differ much unless there are significant income effects (Breffle et al. 2015) . However, WTS refers to the general support for climate change policy, while WTP refers to people's intention to pay for climate change mitigation. We thus expect WTP and WTS levels to be shaped by somewhat different considerations, which are likely to result in higher WTS than WTP levels. The principal consideration is that supporting a policy constitutes a less costly action for the respondent than paying for a policy (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003) . Although our WTP measures in the survey are not set up to make participants pay directly, they generate an idea or feeling of the policy at stake having costly implications. Taking these arguments further, we then examine what types of individuals score similarly at low or high levels on the two measures, and which ones differ. We thus attempt to categorize people along their WTP and WTS levels to examine how potential driving factors impact on these outcome measures and differences across them. For example, the existing literature argues that left political ideology is associated with more favorable attitudes towards climate policy (Harring and Jagers 2013) . But it remains unclear whether this results in higher WTS, WTP, or both.
Study design
The following analysis relies on data from an original nationally representative survey fielded in Brazil between December 28, 2015 and January 12, 2016. We focused on Brazil because of an interest in forest conservation issues related to climate policy and because of Brazil's relevance to global climate change mitigation (Brechin 2003; Gebara et al. 2014) . The survey was designed by the authors and was implemented by YouGov and its local partner in Brazil, Netquest. Details on the sampling strategy can be found in the supplementary information SI-1.
The survey included in random order items on WTS and WTP for forest conservation and climate policy more generally. With regards to WTP, we acknowledge that the existing literature has employed different approaches in examining stated preferences. The first approach gauges WTP in a rather broad sense (e.g., Krosnick and MacInnis 2013) , whereas the second approach results in monetized measurement units (e.g., Kotchen et al. 2013 ). Which of these two approaches is more useful for measuring WTP depends, in our view, on the objective of a given research effort. For the purposes of our study, we follow the first approach. The main reason is that we are interested in comparing WTS and WTP measures and thus prefer to use a similar measurement approach, in the sense of asking survey participants to respond to batteries of survey items, some of which pertain to whether they are willing to support climate mitigation policy and others that pertain to whether they are willing to pay for such policy. Also, we included a range of socio-demographic and other items (see SI-2-SI-5).
Empirical analysis
The analysis reported in this section is organized along the three questions outlined at the outset. First, we examine the extent to which the two measurements (WTS, WTP) generate different results, and whether, as presumed, WTP is lower than WTS. Second, we examine to what extent determinants of WTS and WTP are similar or different. Third, we look at what kinds of people score similarly high or low or different on the two variables.
Are people more willing to support than to pay? A comparison
Our survey included batteries of items for WTS and WTP, respectively. Table 1 shows the scores on these items in simplified, i.e., dichotomized form (the subsequent analysis will use the full information. For item wordings and illustrations, see SI-3 and SI-4). To measure WTS, we used items capturing concern regarding climate change and support To facilitate overall comparison and analysis of determinants of WTS and WTP, respectively, and also mitigate problems of measurement error, we aggregated the individual item scores into composite measures, based on confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The eight WTS items and four WTP items listed in Table 1 were used to that end. We constructed a broad measure of WTS that consists of items referring not only to specific policies for climate change and forest conservation but also to individuals' concern about climate change. The WTP measure focuses on people's willingness to pay additional taxes for forest conservation and financial contributions to environmental NGOs. We do not capture willingness to pay by directly asking people for money or observing their monetary contributions, but asking about their intention to pay for forest conservation. This approach differs from the WTS one, which does not imply or refer to any (direct) costs. The factor loadings indicate the relationship of each variable (item) to the underlying factor (WTS and WTP). The factor loadings for WTS range between 0.29 and 0.45. The factor loadings for WTP range from 0.50 to 0.64 (SI-6). The distribution of the WTS variable is significantly different from the distribution of the WTP variable. The mean for WTP equals 0.80 and the mean for WTS is 0.40. The standard deviation is 0.14 and 0.29, respectively (Table and Figure SI-3) . Average WTP is much lower than average WTS, and WTP scores are much more heterogeneous (much higher standard deviation) than WTS scores. This finding thus responds to the first question, as outlined at the outset of the paper (to what extent the two measures differ). The fact that we observe such differences between the two measurements (i.e., WTS and WTP) raises questions about whether the determinants of WTS and WTP differ as well and what types of people score similarly high or low or different on the two variables.
Determinants of WTS and WTP
To examine whether determinants differ across the two outcome variables of interest, here we regress these two variables on a wide range of potential determinants that have been identified as relevant in prior research (e.g., Geels 2013; Wiseman et al. 2013; Drews and Van den Bergh 2016) . We include two demographic variables, gender and age. Gender is a dummy variable, 1 for male and 2 for female. Age is a count variable ranging from 18 to 78 years old. We also include in the analysis indicators for income, education, and political ideology. Income captures the annual household income of a survey participant and is measured in Brazilian Real. Education captures the highest level of education of a participant. The categories are as follows: no schooling, elementary school, high school, professional training, undergraduate studies, and postgraduate studies. For political ideology, we coded dummy variables (left, center, right, uncertain) and use Buncertain^as the baseline category. Participants are likely to differ in their knowledge of environmental issues (Dolan et al. 2012) . We thus asked participants a question on greenhouse gas emissions (knowledge). Also, we included an item that measures whether participants consider deforestation a crucial environmental issue in Brazil (deforestation salience). Finally, we employ a variable that measures trust in the Brazilian government (trust). Fairbrother (2016) finds that political trust is an important correlate of greater WTP, but not of environmental concern (for item wordings, see SI-5).
In both models shown in Table 2 , we regress WTS (model 1) and WTP (model 2) on a set of potential determinants. Model 1 shows that women and younger participants are on average more willing to pay for forest conservation. We also find that education and the salience of deforestation have a positive and significant effect on WTP. Turpie (2003) , in a study on South Africa, found a positive correlation between WTP and income and knowledge. In another study, Bruderer et al. (2014) found a negative correlation between income and environmentally responsible behavior. In our study, knowledge and income have no significant effect on WTP. This finding could be driven by the current economic recession in Brazil, which is likely to make people more skeptical towards any environmental policy.
Model 2 focuses on determinants of WTS. Unlike in model 1 (WTP), gender is not a significant determinant, and age is a positive and significant predictor of WTS, meaning that older people are more supportive of climate change policy. Knowledge also turns out to be a significant and positive predictor of WTS. Our results regarding trust in the government are in line with previous findings; trust in government, while having a significant positive effect on WTP, has no significant effect on WTS (Fairbrother 2016 ) (see also Table SI-5). Education level, left political ideology, income, and deforestation salience all have similar effects on both outcome variables (positive, except for income, which does not have a significant effect across the models). Refer to the supplementary information SI-6 and SI-7 for additional models and a series of robustness tests.
Explaining similarities and differences between WTS and WTP scores
The differences in what factors drive WTS and WTP, as described and explained in the previous section, point to a need for better understanding of what types of individuals score similarly at low or high levels on the two measurements and which ones differ in what ways. ased on low scores both on WTS and WTP. Five hundred thirty-two individuals were categorized as Bshallow green,^as they score high on WTS but low on WTP. Four hundred ninety-seven individuals were categorized as Bparadox green.^We considered it less likely that an individual would be highly motivated to pay for climate policy whilst she/he does not support it. Note, however, that there might be some borderline cases, namely those who are very close to the median values. For example, there might be individuals with the highest WTS scores within the low WTS category and the lowest WTP within the high WTP category. Finally, Bdeep green^individuals, in our categorization, score high on both variables (N = 698). We are, of course, aware that this categorization is very simple and uses somewhat provocative labels. Yet, we think that this is a useful first attempt to explore how and why people may score similarly or differently on the WTS and WTP variable.
To examine what types of people are more likely to be in which of the four categories, we carried out multinomial regressions, with the four categories serving as classifications on the outcome variable to be explained (Table 3 ). The explanatory variables are those also used for comparison of determinants of WTS and WTP in the previous section ( Table 2 ). The distributions of explanatory variables at the aggregate level and within each of the four categories are graphically shown in SI-7.
The coefficients of multinomial logit models (Table 3) have to be interpreted with regards to a baseline (i.e., one value of the categorical dependent variable). For that purpose, we use the Bnon-green^category (low scores on both WTS and WTP). Coefficients in multinomial logit models, however, cannot be interpreted as slopes, and thus, we provide marginal effects ( Figure SI-7) . Overall, the results indicate that there are substantial differences across the Multinomial logit: standard errors in parentheses. Baseline category is non-green = 1 *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.011 explanatory variables with regards to their effects on the outcome. For example, individuals become economically more conservative with age (Binstock and Quadagno 2001; Goerres 2008) . Our results show that age significantly increases (by 28 percentage points) the probability of an individual to be in the shallow green category, and it is a significantly negative predictor for being in the paradox green and deep green categories. Moreover, women tend to be more concerned about climate change than men (see also McCright 2010). However, we also find that women are somewhat more likely (by 3.7 percentage points) to be in the paradox green category.
We expect that highly educated people are both more supportive and more willing to pay for climate policy. Less educated people, conversely, should be more likely to end up in the non-green category. When increasing education from the minimum to the maximum and holding all other variables constant at their medians, the likelihood of being in the deep green category in fact increases by 22 percentage points. The (perceived) salience of deforestation (i.e., whether participants consider deforestation a crucial environmental issue in Brazil) is a significantly positive predictor for the deep green and the shallow green categories. Individuals who consider deforestation a less salient issue are neither supportive nor willing to pay for forest conservation. In more substantive terms, when increasing perceived salience from the minimum to the maximum (i.e., not salient issue to very salient issue), the likelihood of belonging to the non-green group decreases by 35 percentage points. Conversely, the likelihood of belonging to the deep green category increases by 27 percentage points.
The most knowledgeable individuals belong to the strongest supporters of climate change policy (WTS) (Turpie 2003) , but this does not mean that they are also willing to pay. When increasing knowledge from the minimum to the maximum, the likelihood of belonging to the deep green category increases by 2.2 percentage points. The least knowledgeable individuals are those who do not support forest conservation policy, but are still willing to pay for them (Bparadox green^) (see also Table SI-6). Existing studies find significant differences between different ideological groups and climate change policy in the USA (Nisbet et al. 2015) . In our study, center and right political ideology do not have a strong significant impact on the dependent variable. We find, however, that left-wing individuals are less likely to belong to the non-green category. The results show that a left political viewpoint is associated with a 9-percentage point lower likelihood of belonging to the non-green category.
Finally, trust is an important predictor of WTP. Individuals exhibiting high levels of trust in government are more willing to pay for forest conservation, even if they exhibit only weak support for forest conservation (paradox green). When increasing trust from the minimum to the maximum, the likelihood of belonging to the paradox green category increases by 11 percentage points. Likewise, the likelihood of belonging to the deep green category increases by 8.7 percentage points. However, the chances of belonging to the shallow green category decrease by 7.7 percentage points, while the likelihood of belonging to the non-green category decreases by 12 percentage points.
We also report χ 2 -test statistics and probabilities to assess whether the effects of the explanatory variables are identical across categories (Tables SI-9 and SI-10). Overall, we observe that age, education, left political ideology, salience of the climate change issue, and trust in government are the most important determinants that influence to what category an individual belongs to. These determinants are consistently and significantly positive.
Discussion
Particularly in democratic societies, public opinion acts as a constraint on or facilitator for what policy-makers can do (or avoid doing) in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and thus mitigate adverse consequences of climatic changes. Knowing what the public prefers is important for understanding what current climate policy looks like and where it might be heading and for assessing how current policies compare to what citizens want. These considerations have led to a large and growing body of research on citizens' attitudes and preferences with respect to climate change mitigation policy.
Preferences with respect to climate change mitigation policy are being measured primarily in terms of willingness to support (WTS) and willingness to pay (WTP). While cost considerations clearly do play a role when citizens form preferences with respect to mitigation policy, the existing evidence also shows that other factors matter too (e.g., Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003; Bernauer and McGrath 2016) . Hence, we believe that using both types of measures is the most insightful approach, both in policy and academic terms. This also means, however, that a clearer understanding is needed on how the two measures compare and relate.
In this paper, we thus engage in a systematic comparison of the two measurement approaches (i.e., WTS and WTP), examining the implications for identifying factors that shape public opinion on climate change policy, and also examine what kinds of citizens are likely to score similarly or differently with respect to WTS and WTP. The empirical analysis is based on new public opinion data from a representative sample from Brazil, which faces great challenges in conserving tropical forests and dealing with climate change more generally.
The results reveal substantial differences between WTS and WTP, with WTP turning out to be lower than WTS, as expected. The determinants of WTS and WTP differ to some degree as well, reaffirming that the two measures capture somewhat different facets of public preferences concerning climate policy. The analysis also provides further insights into how individuals group into different combinations of WTS and WTP. When studying these groupings, we find that age, education, left political ideology, salience of deforestation, and trust in government have significant effects.
While the research presented here provides more nuanced insights into different facets of citizens' climate policy preferences, it also has some limitations that could be addressed in further research. Like the large majority of studies on WTP for environmental policy, our measurement captures stated (or intended) rather than revealed or de facto willingness to pay. Additionally, in contrast to some other WTP measurements, our approach does not generate information on how much, in monetary terms, survey participants would pay for particular climate policies (e.g., defined in terms of the GHG emissions they would reduce). Rather, it captures WTP in a more general form. Further research could also measure WTP in direct terms, e.g., by using contingent valuation methods (see Diamond and Hausman 1994; Hanemann 1994) , and compare the resulting measure to our broader WTP variable as well as WTS. Moreover, it would be useful to engage in field experiments, where WTP could be assessed in a more realistic fashion, e.g., in the form of donation campaigns supporting forest conservation. Further research could also look more closely into why certain types of individuals are more willing to support climate policy than to pay for it, and vice versa. Finally, another limitation is that the survey took place while Brazil experienced a major economic downturn. Future research could explore whether WTP is more sensitive to economic downturns than WTS.
The main policy implication of our study is that decision-makers, when planning climate policies, should engage in systematic assessment of both WTS and WTP in order to understand constraints emanating from public support for (or opposition to) such policies. To the extent the determinants of WTS and WTP differ, or are similar at low or high scores, political communication could also be better tailored to specific subgroups.
